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1.  Introduction  
 
Nanotechnologies, the science of controlling the structure of matter at 
the nanoscale, are expected to provide the platform and tools for 
innovative products and applications for consumers while adding 
value to solutions designed to address a myriad of human and 
environmental challenges. This has triggered agents within 
government and industry to invest heavily in nanotechnology 
research and development programs (EC, 2006; Hullman, 2006). The 
results of this investment are steadily coming to fruition, as 
evidenced by the increasing number of self-reported products 
incorporating nanomaterials making their way into commerce 
(Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholar’s Project on 
Emerging Technologies (PEN), 2013). 
In 2006 PEN inventory1 contained 212 products for purchase. 
This number increased to 580 in 2007. In 2011 it was 1317 products, 
and in 2013 the number was 1628 (PEN, 2013; Hansen et al., 2013; 
Bergeson, 2013). The majority of these products are health and fitness 
related products including sporting equipments, cosmetics and 
sunscreens (PEN, 2011; Hansen et al., 2013).  
In February 2014 the US National Science Foundation (NSF) 
identified that the global revenue from nano-enabled products in 
2013 was more than US$1 trillion. In a similar vein, Lux Research 
indicated that the revenue from nano-enabled products has 
continued to grow during the period of 2010-2012; their estimates 
suggest an increase from US$339 billion to US$371 billion. By 2018 
the value of nano-enabled products is predicted to be US$4.4 trillion, 
driven by the expected commercialization success in the healthcare 
                                                
1  An  online  inventory  of  nanotechnology  consumer  based  products.  The  inventory  is  available  at:  
http://www.nanotechproject.org/cpi/about/  (accessed  2  -­‐‑10-­‐‑  2014).  
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and electronics sectors (NSF, 2014; Lux Research, 2014; Ruggie, 2014). 
Whether this will be the case it remains to be seen. However, earlier 
studies make important points indicating that estimations about the 
value of products incorporating nanotechnologies can also be “over-
hyped” by news media or ambiguous due to uncertainties related to 
the size of the “nanotechnology value chain” and the “(sub)areas of 
nanotechnology that the market evaluation includes” (e.g. Seear et 
al., 2009: 54; Ebeling, 2008).  
Concomitant to these debates have been concerns over the 
unintended consequences of some manufactured nanomaterials 
(MNs). These debates have focused on the environmental, health & 
safety (EHS) risks that some MNs may pose to workers handling 
nanomaterials, to consumers of nanobased products, and to the 
public and the environment at large (Maynard et al., 2011a; Medina et 
al., 2011; Nel et al., 2006; RCEP, 2008). Maynard and his colleagues 
(Maynard et al., 2011) have already indicated that some engineered 
nanoparticles (ENPs) such as carbon nanotubes and other bio 
persistent-insoluble nanoparticles such as titanium dioxide may 
under certain conditions present toxicological hazard to humans and 
the environment. One of the main issues is that the unique 
characteristics of nanomaterials followed by rapid advancement and 
commercialization of nanoscience, have challenged the application of 
risk and toxicological assessment methodologies, and regulatory 
oversight strategies outlined in current environmental, health and 
safety regulations (Brown, 2007; Davies, 2006).  
Scientific reviews, such as those carried out by the United 
Kingdom’s Royal Society and Royal Academy of Engineering in 2004 (RS-
RAE, 2004), the United Kingdom’s Royal Commission on Environmental 
Protection in 2008 (RCEP, 2009) and the Center for International 
Environmental Law in 2012 (Azoulay, 2012), emphasize that there are 
scientific and   knowledge   gaps   on   the   hazardous   components,   the  
specific  properties  of  the  components,  the  behavior  of  nanomaterials  
in   the  environment  and/or   living  organisms,  as  well  as   the  duration  
of  the  anticipated  levels  of  exposure  (Hodge  et  al.,  2010:  14).  Groups  
such  as  the  Scientific  Committee  on  Emerging  and  Newly  Identified  
Health   Risks   (SCENIHR)   in   the   EU,   have   also   reported   that   “the  
adverse  effects  of  nanoparticles  cannot  be  predicted  (or  derived)  from  
the   known   toxicity   of  material   of  macroscopic   size,  which   obey   the  
laws  of  classical  physics”  (SCENIHR,  2006:  6). The main uncertainties 
in this regard relate to determining which physico-chemical 
properties impact the toxicokinetics and the environmental 
distribution of nanomaterials (SCHENIHR, 2006). As such, 
formulating even small components of hard regulatory frameworks 
for nanotechnology remains difficult.  
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In relation to new industrial nanomaterials, several tentative 
responses have been observed in jurisdictions such as France (FMD, 
2012), Australia (Australian Government, 2010) and California 
(William et al., 2011), which have moved to set specific requirements 
for some materials. The European Parliament and Council have 
adopted more wholesale approaches with the introduction of nano-
specific provisions for cosmetics as part of the recast of the Cosmetic 
Regulation (Bowman et al., 2010; Bowman, 2014). The vast majority of 
countries, on the other hand, have opted to retain the regulatory 
status quo (Stokes and Bowman, 2012). For example, countries such 
as China, the US, the EU, but also the Organization for Economic Co-
operation   and   Development   (OECD),   have   proposed   to   treat  
nanomaterials   within   the   existing   regulatory   frameworks   covering  
their  conventional  chemical  counterparts  (OECD,  2013;  Hansen  et  al.,  
2013).  This  is  not  surprising  given  the  evolving  state  of  the  scientific  
art   and   the   uncertainties   that   surround   so  many   facets   of   the   tech-­‐‑
nology.      
   Scientific   reports   authored   by   Davies   and   Azoulay   have  
added   to   the   broader   policy   and   regulatory   debate   (Azoulay,   2012;  
Davies,   2006).   These   authors   argue   that   the   application   of   risk   and  
toxicological   assessment   methodologies   and   regulatory   oversight  
strategies   outlined   in   current   environmental,   health,   and   safety  
regulations   are   inappropriate   and   too   inflexible   to   cope   with   the  
rapid   advancements   and   the   potential   risks   of   nanoscience.   At   the  
other  hand  of  the  spectrum,  other  reports  such  as  those  issued  by  the  
OECD   (OECD,   2013),   emphasize   that   existing   approaches   for   the  
testing   and   assessment   of   traditional   chemicals   are   in   general  
adequate   to  deal  with  nanotechnology   and  only   in   some   cases   they  
may   have   to   be   adapted   to   the   specificities   of   nanomaterials.  
Accordingly,   the   debate   on   how   to   embrace   nanotechnology  
developments  continues  among  policy  makers,  while  the  public  and  
private  sectors  have  voiced  fears  of  the  potential  for  under  -­‐‑  and  over  
-­‐‑  regulation.2    
Whereas consensus amongst regulators and policy makers on 
the most appropriate regulatory response remains elusive, a number 
of stakeholders coming from the industry, non-governmental bodies 
and other public/private sectors, have joint forces to address and 
respond to the regulatory challenges of nanotechnology. These actors 
have focused on the development and implementation of voluntary 
governance arrangements and innovative measurement techniques. 
                                                
2  Both  US  and  European  Union  key  bodies  including,  for  example,  the  US  Executive  Office  of  
the  President  and  the  European  Commission  claim  that  the  existing  regulations  covering  
chemicals  and  materials,  as  well  as  environmental  and  health  issues  are  adequate  to  deal  with  
nanotechnologies.  
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These arrangements are voluntary, non-binding and utilize the 
expertise of a wide range of governmental, industrial and civil society 
actors. The involvement of multiple actors, knowledgeable experts 
and epistemic communities in one regulatory setting are considered 
the key elements that shape the governing authority of these 
arrangements (Abbott et al., 2009; Börzel and Risse, 2005; Black, 2008; 
Quack, 2010). Furthermore, many scholars argue that these 
arrangements provide for voluntary rules or guidelines that are 
continuously revised to provide the most up-to-date information on 
technology developments and cope with situations of regulatory 
uncertainty  (Abbott and Snidal, 2009; Abbott et al., 2012; Dorbeck-
Jung and Amerom, 2008; EC, 2008; Forsberg, 2010). As such they are 
expected to be able to respond quickly to the speed, complexity and 
uncertainty of nanotechnology’s development.  
The   landscape   of   these   arrangements   is   very   broad.   For  
instance,   at   national   level   we   can   observe   governmental   and   non-­‐‑
governmental   (e.g.   NGOs)   actors   such   as   the   Department   for  
Environment,   Food   and   Rural   Affairs   (DEFRA)   in   UK,   the   US  
Environmental   Protection   Agency   (EPA),   as   well   as   Friends   of   the  
Earth   (FoE)   in   Australia.   Amongst   the   main   objectives   of   these  
arrangements   have   been   to   develop   “voluntary   reporting   schemes”  
or   “stewardship   programs”   to   gather   scientific data (from the 
manufacturers and importers of manufactured nanoscale materials) 
on the characteristics, toxicity and eco(toxity) of  MNs, and assist 
regulators with developing appropriate risk management 
frameworks for nanoscale materials (Bowman and Hodge, 2009).  
Voluntary initiatives have also been initiated by private 
actors, such as for example the Responsible NanoCode in UK 
(developed by four partners - the Royal Society, Insight Investment, 
the Nanotechnology Industries Association and the Nanotechnology 
Knowledge Transfer Network); BASF in Germany (which developed 
the Code of Conduct for Nanotechnology); DuPont - Environmental 
Defense in the US (which developed the NanoRisk Framework). The 
main objectives of these developments have been (amongst others) to 
develop “in-house” innovative regulatory mechanisms that govern 
the manufacture of nanoproducts, manage occupational, health and 
safety risks associated with the development of nanotechnology 
across all lifecycle phases, and ensure the responsible development, 
production, use and disposal of nanoscale materials (e.g. BASF 
NanoCode; DuPont NanoRisk Framework).  
There have been several initiatives taken at the European level 
as well. For instance, the European Commission (EC) voluntary Code 
of Conduct for Responsible Nanoscience and Nanotechnologies Research - 
invites Member States to foster their collaboration with industry, 
research organizations and civil society, and provide a “tangible 
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contribution to the good governance of nanotechnology” (EC, 2007: 
2). In 2005 the European Committee for Standardization (CEN) set up 
a Technical Committee on Nanotechnologies (i.e. TC 352) to develop 
consensus standards related to broader issues of nanotechnologies, 
such as terminology and nomenclature, metrology and 
instrumentation, specifications for reference materials, test 
methodologies, as well as science-based health, safety and 
environmental practices (British Standards Institution (BSI), 2007).  
However, some commentators have been highly critical with 
the operation of some of these arrangements (e.g. the DEFRA and 
EPA voluntary reporting schemes), noting that even though they are 
voluntary in nature they have failed to make a positive impact in 
practice, resulting in a low number of submission (or the lack of buy-
in) from relevant organizations and stakeholders (Bowman and 
Hodge, 2007; Dorbeck-Jung and Amerom, 2008; EPA, 2007; Hansen et 
at. 2013). Other arrangements (e.g. the EC Code of Conduct) have 
also been criticized by some scholars for failing to promote trust-
building amongst key stakeholders, disseminate their activities 
effectively and raise awareness about the potential benefits of 
implementing these arrangements (Dorbeck-Jung and Shelley-Egan, 
2013; Mantovani et al., 2009). Furthermore, the global significance of 
issues accompanying nanotechnologies (e.g. scientific, regulatory and 
socio-environmental), the evolvement of the new generations of 
nanomaterials, the rapid pace of the commercialization of nano-
enabled products, as well as the potential of MNs to cross national 
boundaries are amongst the key factors which pose further 
challenges for these arrangements to deal with nanotechnologies 
(Abbott et al., 2010; Falkner and Jaspers, 2012).  
Since  the  mid-­‐‑2000  a  wide  range  of   transnational  governance  
arrangements   (TGAs)  have   emerged   in   the   field  of  nanotechnology.  
By   the   term   “transnational”   we   refer   to   “non-­‐‑territorial   policy  
making  or  interactions  that  cross  national-­‐‑borders  at  levels  other  than  
sovereign   to   sovereign”(Hallström   and   Boström,   2010:   2;   Hale   and  
Held,   2011:   4).   We   use   the   term   transnational   governance  
arrangement   to   refer   to   a   set   of   rules/mechanisms   within   an  
institutional   setting   that   influence   the   interaction   between   various  
actors  (state  and  non-­‐‑state  actors  not  bounded  by  territorial  borders),  
to   provide   for   voluntary   rules   or   guidelines   grounded   in   practical  
experience  and  expertise.    
For   instance,   the   two   most   important   TGAs   in   the   field   of  
nanotechnologies   are   the   OECD   and   the   International  
Standardisation  Organization  (ISO)  (Breggin  et  al.,  2009).  In  addition,  
there  are  other  public-­‐‑private  and  private  governance  arrangements  
in   which   nanotechnologies   are   discussed.   These   arrangements   are  
mostly   focused   on   a   specific   sector   (e.g.   nanomaterial   safety)   and  
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have   led   to   a   range   specific   projects,   workshops   or   dialogues.   For  
instance,   the   International   Council   on  Nanotechnology   (ICON);   the  
International  Risk  Governance  Council  (IRGC);  and  the  International  
Cooperation   on   Cosmetic   Regulations   (ICCR).   Intergovernmental  
initiatives   that   seek   to   contribute   to   nanotechnology   related   safety  
issues   and   foster   the   cooperation   of   scientists,   policy-­‐‑makers   and  
industrial   actors,   are   based   on   the   United   Nations   (UN)   and   the  
World   Health   Organization   (WTO)   processes.   For   instance,   the  
United  Nations  Industrial  Development  Organization’s  International  
Centre   for   Science   and  High   Technology   (UNIDO)   and   the  WHO’s  
intergovernmental   forum  on  Chemical   Safety   (IFCS)   (Breggin   et   al.,  
2009;  Falkner  and  Jaspers,  2012).    
In  many  of   these   arrangements   states  have  become  only  one  
type   of   participating   actor   amongst   others   in   the   decision-­‐‑making  
process   (Djelic   and   Andersson,   2006).   As   such,   they   depart   from  
traditional   forms   of   regulation   that   are   based   on   the   exclusive  
authority   of   the   nation   state   to  make   collectively   binding  decisions.  
They  are  based  on  different  governance  actors,  networking  strategies,  
processes   and   structures   (Handl,   2012).   While   these   arrangements  
have   received   significant   attention   in   political   science,   international  
relation  (IR)  theory  and  (international)  law  (Koppell,  2010;  Pauwelyn,  
2012;   Slaughter,   2004),   the   analytical   questions   provided   by   these  
studies   are   not   fully   complete.  Current  discussions   focus  mostly   on  
explaining   the   differences   between   transnational   arrangements   and  
traditional  state-­‐‑based  forms  of  regulation.  However,  they  focus  less  
on   explaining   the   key   factors   that   drive   the   emergence   of   these  
arrangements.3   In   these   studies   it   is   still   unclear   why   certain  
arrangements   have   gained   a   leading   role   at   transnational   level   or  
which   arrangements   are   likely   to   have   the   highest   potential   to  
contribute  to  the  governance  of  nanotechnology.4  What  are  their  key  
attributes   and   power   sources?   This   chapter   purports   to   further  
answer  these  questions.    
                                                
3  Exceptions are the studies of: Abbott, W. K., Marchant, E.G. and Sylvester, J.D. (2006). A 
Framework Convention For Nanotechnology?” Environmental Law Review. 36, pp. 10931-42 ; 
Abbott, W. K. and Snidal, D. (2009). Strengthening International Regulation Through 
Transnational New Governance: Overcoming The Orchestration Deficit, Vanderbilt Journal Of 
Transnational Law, 42, pp. 501, 506–07; Abbott, W.K., Sylvester, J.D. and Marchant, E.G. (2010). 
Transnational Regulation Of Nanotechnology: Reality or Romanticism?, eds Hodge, A.G., Bowman, 
M.D. and Maynard, D. A., “International Handbook On Regulating Nanotechnologies”, 
(Edward Elgar, UK, USA), pp. 525-545.  
4 Yet, in legal science a debate was started on the reasons explaining a shift from formal legal 
agreements to informal arrangements, including transnational actors. It has been argued that 
this can partly be explained by: (a) saturation with the existing treaties and changed policy 
preferences of States; (b) deep societal changes that are not unique to international law but 
affect both international and national legal systems, in particular: the transition towards an 
increasingly diverse network society; and (c) an increasingly complex knowledge society. See: 
Pauwelyn, J., Wessel, R.A. and Wouters, J. (2014). When Structures Become Shackles: Stagnation 
and Dynamics in International Lawmaking, European Journal of International Law, pp.11-34. 
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Building  upon  the  regulatory  challenges  of  nanotechnologies,  
this   chapter   analyzes   the   attributes   and   the   potential   of   the   key  
transnational   nanotechnology   governance   arrangements,   which  
provide   forums   of   debate   at   transnational   level   and   contribute   to  
establishing   informal   coordination   mechanisms.   In   particular,   our  
focus   is   on:   ISO   Technical   Committee   on   Nanotechnology   (ISO/TC  
229);   OECD   Working   Party   on   Manufactured   Nanomaterials    
(OECD/WPMN);  IFCS;  IRGC  and  ICON    
There   are   several   reasons   that   justify   our  decision   to   focus   on  
these   arrangements.   To   begin   with,   these   arrangements   have  
displayed   well-­‐‑defined   strategies   and   plans   to   develop   voluntary  
mechanisms   that   are   relevant   to   the  governance  of  nanotechnology.  
In  addition,  there  has  been  no  formal  delegation  or  legal  mandate  for  
these  arrangements  to  contribute  to  the  field  of  nanotechnology  or  set  
norms   which   can   serve   as   reference   points.   However,   all   of   them  
have  managed   to   establish   internal  mandates   by   securing   resources  
and   collaboration   with   influential   stakeholders   and   experts   in   the  
field.   As   a   result,   the   potential   of   these   arrangements   to   the  
regulatory   governance   of   nanotechnologies   has   been   acknowledged  
in  various  reports   (e.g.  Breggin  et  al.,  2009;  Davies,  2006;  Mantovani  
et  al.,  2009  &  2010;  Hansen  et  al.,  2013;  Renn  and  Rocco,  2006),  policy  
documents   (e.g.   EC,   2007a;   EC,   2008a;   EC,   2008b;   EC,   2011)   and  
scholarly   debates   (e.g.   Abbott   and   Snidal,   2009;   Abbott   et   al.,   2010;  
Bowman   and  Hodge,   2009;   Bowman,   2014;   Blind   and   Gauch,   2009;  
Falkner  and  Jaspers,  2012;  Miles,  2007).    
This   chapter   is   organized   as   follows.   In   the   first   section,  we  
discuss   the   factors   that  have   contributed   to   the   emergence  of  TGAs  
and   emphasize   why   these   modes   of   governance   are   considered  
appropriate  to  respond  to  the  nanotechnology  regulatory  challenges.  
In   the   second   section,   we   introduce   a   typology   that   distinguishes  
governance  arrangements  on   the  basis  of  actors   involved,  as  well  as  
the   functions   and   the   regulatory   stages   in   which   the   arrangements  
contribute.  We  emphasize  that  TGAs  can  be  characterized  not  only  by  
these   attributes,   but   also   by   their   degree   of   institutionalization5   as  
well   as   the   normative   and   substantive   depth   of   transnational  
outcomes.   In   the   third   section,  we   assess   the   characteristics   and   the  
potential   of   the   five   aforementioned   nanotechnology   TGAs.   With  
these   cases   we   demonstrate   that   the   typology   developed   in   this  
chapter   is  useful   to   study   the  evolution  of   transnational  governance  
in   the   field   of   nanotechnologies.   Specifically,   it   allows   us   to  
understand   and   investigate   the   actions   taken   by   various  
                                                
5 For more information on the institutionalization of regulatory networks see also: Berman, A. 
and Wessel, R.A. (2012). The International Legal Status of Informal International Law-making Bodies: 
Consequences for Accountability, eds. Pauwelyn, J., Wessel, R.A. and Wouters, J., “Informal 
International Lawmaking”, (Oxford University Press, Oxford), pp. 35-62. 
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arrangements  to  enhance  their  capacity  to  contribute  effectively  to  the  
governance   of   nanotechnologies.   The   last   section   provides   analysis  
and  concluding  remarks.    
  
Section 2. The Transnationalisation of Nanotechnology 
Governance  
 
The   proliferation   of   TGAs   in   the   field   of   nanotechnologies   can   be  
related  to  several  political,  regulatory  and  technological  factors.  First,  
over  the  last  few  decades  nanotechnologies  have    emerged  as  a  new  
transformative   force   in   industrial   society,   covering  a  broad   range  of  
applications  in  chemicals,  pharmaceuticals,  electronics,  energy,  goods  
and   cosmetics   (Breggin   et   al.,   2009).   Therefore,   these   emerging  
technologies   have   attracted   the   attention   of   a   wide   range   of   actors  
coming   from   regulatory,   civil   society   and   business   organizations  
whose   activities   span   beyond   national   borders   (Abbott   et   al.,   2010;  
Mantovani   et   al.,   2010).   Nanotechnologies   have   also   attracted   a  
diverse  range  of  skilled  scientists,6  who  contribute   to   the  creation  of  
new  products/services  and  advice  for  any  innovation  in  this  field.  As  
a   result,   nanotechnology  governance  has   become  highly   exposed   to  
the  direct  influence  of  non-­‐‑state  actors  (Abbot  et  al.,  2012;  Breggin  et  
al.,  2009).    
Second,   the   research,   manufacturing,   use   and   commerce   of  
nanotechnologies  are  all  global  in  nature  (Abbot  et  al.,  2010;  Abbot  et  
al.,  2010;  Marchant  et  al.,  2012).  The  experience  with  other  technology  
developments   on   genetically   modified   organisms   (GMOs)   and  
regulatory  issues  associated  with  asbestos,  have  led  to  many  debates  
on   how   to   develop   appropriate   and   congruent   governance  
frameworks   for   nanotechnologies   (Bonny,   2003;   Forsberg,   2012;  
Vogel,   2006).   Furthermore,   the   case   of  GMOs   emphasize   clearly   the  
challenges   and   issues   that   may   arise   when   products   that   may   be  
traded   internationally   face   a   patchwork   set   of   national   rules   and  
regulations   (Marchant   et   al.,   2012).7   Abbott   and   other   colleagues  
(2010)   argue   that   a   transnational   approach   to   nanotechnology  
regulation   can   contribute   to   providing   better   opportunities   for  
dialogue  and  learning  by  which  harmonized  regulatory  requirements  
could   be   established   for   product   testing,   risk   assessment,   reporting  
                                                
6 Most of these scientists have expertise in physics, chemistry, biology, information technology, 
toxicology, engineering and materials science.  
7 The various regulatory frameworks and standards used at the EU and US has created a wide 
range of problems, including restrictions on trade in products that were approved in some 
countries and not in others, as well as many conflicts with regards to the technical issues on the 
labelling of products containing GMO components (see: Marchant, E.G., Abbot, W.K., Sylvester, 
J.D and Gulley, M.L., 2012. Transnational New Governance and International Coordination of 
Nanotechnology Oversight, in Dana, A.D. (Eds), The Nanotechnology Challenge: Creating Legal 
Institutions for Uncertain Risks, Cambridge University Press : NY (pp.179-203)).	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and   labeling.   Harmonized   requirements   would   in   turn   assist  
producers,  manufacturers  and  distributors   to  benefit   throughout  the  
product   life-­‐‑cycle,   and   regulators   to   avoid   regulation   that   is   “ill-­‐‑
informed   or   too   stringent”   (Abbott   et   al.,   2010:   541).   In   addition,   it  
will   assist   multinational   companies   at   the   supply,   manufacturing,  
consumer   and   disposal   stage   to   deal   with   environmental,  
occupational   health   and   safety   issues.   A   transnational   approach   to  
these   issues   can   lead   to   uniform   compliance   requirements,   product  
stewardship,   worker   training,   occupational   safety   and   reporting  
programs   (Abbott   et   al.,   2010;   Bonny,   2003;   Breggin   et   al.,   2009;  
Falkner   and   Jaspers,   2012).   Furthermore,   the   global   reach   of  
nanotechnology  research  and  trade  provide  additional  incentives  for  
developing   regulatory   frameworks   at   transnational   level,  which   are  
expected   to   facilitate   commerce,   underpin   good   industrial   practice  
and   avoid   regional   divide   (Abbott   and   Snidal,   2009;   Abbott   et   al.,  
2010;  Falkner  and  Jaspers,  2012).    
Third,   whereas   nanotechnologies   are   surrounded   by   great  
expectations,  scientific  evidence  indicates  that  the  ongoing  expansion  
of   nanotechnologies   may   lead   to   the   production   of   novel  
nanostructures   that   cause   unknown   forms   of   hazard   (Breggin   et   al.  
2009).   As   emphasized   in   the   previous   section   regulators   are   facing  
many  challenges  and  uncertainties  about  the  adequacy  of  the  existing  
risk  assessment  and  management  frameworks  to  define,  characterize  
and  assess  the  (potential)  risks  associated  with  nanotechnologies.  The  
rapid  pace  of  commercialization  followed  by  the  evolvement  of  new  
generations   of   nanomaterials   pose   additional   challenges   to   the  
current   regulatory   frameworks   to   deal   with   emerging   technologies  
(EPA,   2007).   Regulatory   systems   are   expected   to   face   several  
challenges,  which  relate  mainly  to  their  ability  to:    
-­‐ deal  with  novel  materials  and  uncertain  risks;  
-­‐ anticipate  and  respond  rapidly  to  the  new  and  changing  
technological  systems;    
-­‐ develop  frameworks  that  offer  sufficient  flexibility  and  
adaptability;    
-­‐ expand  the  scientific  capacity  to  include  a  diversity  of  mixed    
experts  from  public  and  private  sectors;  and    
-­‐ develop  globally  oriented  information-­‐‑gathering  systems  to  cope  
with  the  globalization  of  nanotechnology  (Davies,  2006).    
  
  
Given  the  fundamental  nature  of  these  challenges  and  the  inability  of  
the  individual  states  to  tackle  these  issues  effectively,  many  scholars  
urge   for   transnational   coordination   and   cooperation   (Abbott   et   al.,  
2010;   Breggin   et   al.,   2009;  Cadman,   2011;   Falkner   and   Jaspers,   2012;  
Forsberg,  2010).    
10  
 
Finally,   over   the   last   two   decades,   nanotechnologies   have  
exploded  from  a  purely  technical  field,  into  an  arena  that  has  to  cope  
with   constitutionally   recognized   interests   also.   The   development   of  
nanotechnologies   involves   issues   related   to   health,   environment,  
occupational   safety,   employment,   scientific   research,   technological  
development,   national   security   and   so   on   (Dorbeck-­‐‑Jung   and  
Amerom,   2008).   The   potential   of   nanotechnologies   to   manipulate  
properties  at   the  nano  scale   (i.e.  making  materials   stronger,   thinner,  
more   elastic   and   so   forth)   has   made   these   technologies   to   impact  
almost   every   industrial   sector   (Forsberg,   2012).   However,   the  
growing   production   and   use   of   nanomaterials   (in   particular   MNs)  
may   increase   the  potential   of   exposure   for  workers,   consumers   and  
environment   (NRC,   2012).   This   has   triggered   representatives   of  
various  civil  society  and  labor  coalitions  to  become  highly  interested  
on   the   benefits   and   risks   of   nanomaterials,   as   well   as   on   the  
regulatory  responses  addressing   these   issues   (ETC,  2007;  Mantovani  
et   al.,   2010).   As   a   result,   nanotechnologies   have   experienced   an  
evolving   political   landscape,   with   many   countries,   national  
regulators,   socio-­‐‑environmental   actors   and   international  
organizations,   participating   in   voluntary   (and   often   privately   led)  
initiatives   to   promote   the   regulatory   coordination   of  
nanotechnologies  (Abbott  and  Snidal,  2009;  Abbot  and  Snidal,  2009a;  
Abbott  et  al.,  2010;  Kica  and  Bowman,  2012).  These  developments,  we  
would   argue,   provide   additional   incentives   for   the   emergence   of  
TGAs.   In   the   following   section   we   provide   a   typology   for  
understanding   the   characteristics   and   the   potential   of   various  
governance  arrangements  at  the  transnational  level.    
Section 3. Transnational Governance Arrangements 
Generally and Their Attributes 
 
TGAs come in different forms at transnational level. Whereas there is 
no single characteristic that would distinguish TGAs from the 
traditional modes of governance, Pauwelyn (2012) indicates that new 
governance arrangements are characterized by:  
 
1) process informality - (these arrangements build on the cross-border 
cooperation between public and private actors in a forum other 
than a traditional international organization);  
2) actor informality - (these arrangements build upon the 
cooperation of actors other than traditional diplomatic actors 
(e.g. regulators or agencies))8; and  
                                                
8 In is interesting to note that in these arrangements the governance contributions are not 
explicitly restricted to those actors whose organizational objective lies in the provision of certain 
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3) output informality - (these arrangements do not result in a formal 
treaty or legally enforceable commitment).  
 
These characteristics come close to the characteristics of the 
transnational new forms of governance that Abbott and Snidal have 
discussed (2009). In their framing new forms of governance are 
fundamentally distinguished from old governance models by:  
 
1) differing roles of the state in regulation - (in new governance the 
state is a significant player, it acts as a facilitator for supporting 
voluntary and cooperative programs, rather than as a top-down 
commander);  
2) decentralization of the regulatory authority - (in new governance 
regulatory responsibilities are shared among different actors 
coming from the state agencies and private sectors);  
3) dispersed expertise - (new governance seeks to harness the 
expertise of a wide range of actors, it looks beyond professional 
regulators and also seeks to incorporate those who may have 
‘local’ expertise on relevant issues); and  
4) non-mandatory rules - (new governance relies on flexible norms 
and voluntary rules). 
  
In a similar vein, Börzel and Risse (2005) argue that the more we 
enter the realm of new modes of governance, the more we 
decentralize the regulatory authority, include non-hierarchical forms 
of steering and share the regulatory responsibilities between public 
and private actors.9 As a result, various forms of governance 
arrangements have emerged at transnational level encompassing 
different actors, modes of steering, processes and outcomes (Handl, 
2012). Therefore, a typology of TGAs is important to understand their 
key features and their role to respond to regulatory issues (Andonova 
et al., 2009; Börzel and Risse, 2005).  
Scholars have proposed various typologies painting the key 
features of TGAs. To begin with, Andonova and colleagues (2009) 
propose a typology according to which governance arrangements can 
be characterized on the basis of actors involved (types of actors) and 
                                                                                                              
public goals (e.g. regulators, humanitarian or environmental organizations). Rather, the 
authority of transnational governance arrangements might also emerge from various private 
actors, such as business associations, industry or multinational companies. See: Knill, Ch. and 
Lehmkuhl, D., 2002. Private Actors and the State: Internationalization and changing patterns of 
governance, Governance 5, p. 42. 
9 Building upon the constellations of state and non-state actors to induce regulation at 
transnational level, Börzel and Risse (2005) distinguish four types of arrangements: cooptation 
(regular consultation and cooptation of private actors in international negotiation systems); 
delegation (delegation of state functions to private actors); co-regulation (co-regulation of public 
and private actors); self-regulation (private self-regulation in the shadow of hierarchy). 
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functions. With regards to the types of actors, they argue that TGAs 
involve a variety of state and non-state actors that contribute 
different capacities and sources of authority. They distinguish 
between: 
 
1) private arrangements - (established and managed by non-state 
actors);  
2) public arrangements - (established by public actors acting 
independently from the state); and 
3) hybrid arrangements - (established by public and private actors 
jointly).  
 
However, the types of actors are considered as a necessary, but not a 
sufficient condition for distinguishing amongst transnational 
arrangements. The authors argue that these arrangements should be 
clustered also in terms of the functions that they can or do perform. In 
their framing, functions determine the resources and the power used 
within a particular arrangement to steer members to achieve certain 
goals (Andonova et al., 2009). In principle, the functions of the TGAs 
are divided into five categories:  
 
1) information sharing - (arrangements that influence political and 
civil discourse through learning forums or collaborative events);  
2) capacity building - (arrangements that provide resources or 
institutional support through fundraising campaigns or 
sponsorship);  
3) coordination - (arrangements that coordinate state and non-state 
activities in a particular sector);  
4) rule-setting - (arrangements that contribute to adopting 
international norms, regulations or standards that respond to 
respective regulatory problems); and  
5) implementation - (arrangements that provide monitoring and 
service provision to enable action or implementation of national 
or international policy goals).  
 
A different approach is taken by Abbott and Snidal (2009a), who 
propose the concept of a governance triangle to depict the 
involvement of various actors (i.e. states, firms and NGOs) in 
respective governance arrangements. Similar to the framework 
employed by Andonova et al. (2009), the typology of Abbott and 
Snidal focuses on rule-setting. These authors take a wider perspective 
and divide rule-setting (in the authors’ words - the regulatory process 
of standard setting) into five distinct phases:  
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1) agenda-setting - (ability of the arrangement to place an issue on 
the regulatory agenda);  
2) negotiations - (ability of the arrangement to draft and promulgate 
standards);  
3) implementation - (ability of the arrangement to contribute to the 
implementation of the standards);  
4) monitoring - (ability of the arrangement to monitor compliance); 
and  
5) enforcement - (ability of the arrangement to ensure effective 
compliance).  
 
Their basic premise is that in order for the TGAs to succeed in the 
regulatory process they need a suite of competences, such as: 
independence from the targets of regulation, representativeness, 
expertise of several kinds and concrete operational capacity 
(including resources) (Abbot and Snidal, 2009a). However, since in 
the most cases single-actor schemes do not have all the necessary 
competences, the authors argue that collaboration with different 
types of actors is essential for these governance schemes to assemble 
the needed competences and act effectively in the regulatory process. 
According to their line of argumentation, the potential of TGAs can 
be understood by looking at the design choice of these arrangements 
- in particular at the relative input that states, NGOs and firms 
exercise in a respective arrangement and the actions taken by the 
TGAs to fulfill any competency deficit. Focusing on the regulatory 
standard setting schemes of pre – and – post –1985,  the authors 
observe a shift from old to newly emerging multi-actor schemes, 
characterized by high level of decentralization and dispersed 
expertise (Abbott and Snidal, 2009a). Whereas these characteristics 
make these arrangements better suited to address regulatory gaps at 
transnational level, the authors suggest that some form of “facilitative 
state orchestration” is important to reduce the bargaining problems 
between firms and NGOs to achieve socially desirable outcomes 
(Abbott and Snidal, 2009a: 88). 
In addition to the types of actors and functions, Abbott and his 
colleagues (2012), Liese and Beishem (2011), Homkes (2011) and 
Martens (2007) suggest a typology for mapping TGAs based on the 
level of institutionalization and the design choice. In the view of Martens 
(2007) and Homkes (2011) these are the key factors driving the 
decision-making power of the governance arrangements. Martens 
(2007) notes that governance arrangements can be classified in low, 
medium and high levels of institutionalization. Whereas high levels of 
institutionalization refer to permanent multistakeholder institutions 
that have formal membership, firmly established governing bodies, 
institutionalized rules of decision-making, a secretariat and budget 
14  
 
authority; medium levels of institutionalization refer to institutions that 
have a clearly defined membership, but not a separate legal status or 
formalized decision-making structures; and low levels of 
institutionalization refer to ad-hoc initiatives with narrowly defined 
objectives, no formalized membership or governing body. Scholars of 
transnational governance have also given increasing credence to the 
regulatory design - referring in particular to the stages of the 
regulatory process that the arrangement addresses, the relative 
precision of the rules (they frame this as normative scope), as well as 
the obligatory status of the transantional outcomes (they frame this as 
substantive depth) (Abbott et al., 2012; Liese and Beishem, 2011).  
In this way, the typology of TGAs has become a complex and 
multidimensional phenomenon, which cannot be analyzed through 
one prism only (Djelic and Andersson, 2006). To assess the potential 
of these arrangements in a regulatory governance one should 
understand how various attributes characterizing TGAs interact with 
each other and contribute to the efficiency of the arrangement 
(Abbott et al., 2012). Table 1.1 emphasizes the key attributes of the 
TGAs, which can be used to categorize them into various groups and 
assess their role in a structured way. In the next Section we apply 
these attributes to understand the landscape and the potential of 
current transnational governance arrangements in the regulatory 
governance of nanotechnologies.  
 
Table 1.1. The Key Attributes of Transnational Governance 
Arrangements 
 
Actors Involved 
 
Functions 
 
Regulatory 
Process 
 
Normative 
Scope 
 
Substantive 
Depth 
   Degree of 
institutionalization 
Public Actors Only 
(Single Actor Scheme) 
Information 
sharing 
Agenda-
Setting 
Narrow Significant 
constraints 
Low 
Level 
Private Actors Only  
(Single Actor Scheme) 
 Capacity building Negotiations Broad Excessive 
Flexibility 
Medium 
Level 
Public and Private 
Actors  (Multi-Actor 
Scheme) 
Coordination Implementation   High 
Level 
  Rule Setting Monitoring 
Implementation Enforcement 
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Section  4.    The  Governance  Of  Nanotechnologies:  A  
Typology  Of  Transnational  Governance  Arrangements    
  
Since   the   mid-­‐‑2000,   various   TGAs   have   emerged   to   discuss  
nanotechnology.  In  the  following  we  focus  on  five  key  arrangements  
and  discuss  their  activities  in  the  field  of  nanotechnologies:    
 
4.1. ISO Technical Committee on Nanotechnology  
 
In January 2005, the ISO Technical Management Board (TMB) 
established a new technical committee focused specifically in 
developing nanotechnology standards (TC 229). A technical 
committee that “would provide industry, research and regulators 
with a coherent set of robust and well-founded standards in the area 
of nanotechnologies […] whilst at the same time providing 
regulators, and society in general, with suitable and appropriate 
instruments for the evaluation of risk and the protection of health 
and the environment” (ISO, 2005).  
In the first plenary meeting of the TC 229 the scope of the 
Committee was articulated as well as the internal structure and the 
business plan. Kica and Bowman (2012 and 2013), provide a detailed 
discussion on the internal structure of TC 229. The main work in the 
TC 229 is done by its Working Groups (WGs) (ISO/IEC, 2011). The 
Committee allocates specific tasks to the WGs, which tasks are 
carried out by experts, who are individually appointed by a 
participating ISO member body, a liaison organisation, or both, to a 
particular WG when new projects are approved. TC 229 consists of 
four WGs working on:  
 
 
 
a) Terminology and Nomenclature (WG1- develops uniform 
terminology and nomenclature for nanotechnologies to facilitate 
communication and promote common understanding); 
b) Measurement and Characterization (WG2 - develops measurement 
and characterization standards for use by industry in 
nanotechnology-based products);  
c) Health, Safety and Environment (WG3 - develops science-based 
standards that aim to promote occupational safety, consumer 
protection and environmental protection); and 
d) Measurement and Characterization (WG4 - develops standards that 
specify relevant characteristics of engineered nanoscale materials 
for use in specific applications) (ISO, 2012).  
 
 
 
Besides the central Secretariat leading the work of the TC 229, each of 
the WGs has its secretaries and convenors who arrange the meetings 
and communicate important information to the participants. The 
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inclusion of various WG with different aims and objectives, 
emphasizes that TC 229 has shifted the focus from working only on 
technical issues related to defining the size and concept of 
nanomaterials, to addressing broader aspects of the technology such 
as risk management, health, environment and safety issues (Kica and 
Bowman, 2013).10 Following this evolution in the development of 
standards, in 2009 the former chair of the TC 229 stated that ISO 
standards now serve three key objectives:  
 
a)  supporting commercialization and market development;  
b)  providing a basis for procurement through technical, quality and  
environmental management; and  
c) supporting appropriate legislation/regulation and voluntary 
governance structures (Hatto, 2008).  
 
Therefore, TC 229 and its standards seem to have multiple functions. 
TC 229 provides a forum for debate for various actors. Its “plenary 
week” meetings organized every tenth month of the year, as well as 
WG meetings provide the best opportunities for experts to meet with 
other delegates exchange knowledge and information on 
standardisation issues, and set appropriate and uniform standards.  
Regarding the representation of actors in TC 229, it is 
important to note that nanotechnology standards are developed by 
groups of experts under the overarching TC umbrella. ISO applies 
the principle of national delegation and its administrative work takes 
place through a Secretariat located in one of the National 
Standardization Bodies (NSBs). Delegates participate in the ISO/TC 
meetings in negotiations and consultations that are intended to lead 
to the development of an international consensus. As indicated in the 
ISO/IEC Directives, all national bodies have the same rights to 
participate in the work of the committees and subcommittees 
(ISO/IEC, 2011). TC 229 has 34 participatory and 13 observatory 
members.  
ISO  has  established  procedures  for  including  industrial  actors  
as  well  as  other  actors  in  the  standardization  process  (Forsberg,  2010).  
Within   ISO   the   participating   actors   are   divided   into:   industry   and  
trade   associations;   consumer   associations;   governments   and  
regulators;   as  well   as   societal   and  other   interests.   In   that   sense,   ISO  
standardization  process   is   considered   as   a  multistakeholder  process  
                                                
10 In 2011 ISO/TC229 took a leading role to developing a guidance document related to labeling 
of nanomaterials, which complements the current regulatory initiatives on the labelling of food 
and cosmetic products containing manufactured nano-objects. An increasing focus on health, 
safety, and environmental issues appear to have provided TC229 with the impetus to publish 
ISO/TR12885 on Nanotechnologies - Health and Safety Practices in Occupational Settings Relevant to 
Nanotechnologies. 
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open   to   a   variety   of   actors   and   experts.   TC   229   has   a   number   of  
collaborations   and   relationships   with   other   organisations   and  
standardization  bodies  as  well   (David,   2007).  TC  229   is  opened   to  a  
broader   range   of   stakeholders   who   are   not   connected   with   ISO  
through   national   bodies.   These   stakeholders are known as liaison 
members, and include manufacturer associations, commercial and 
professional associations, industrial consortia, user groups, as well as 
groups concerned with the rights of consumers workers and 
environment, (e.g. the European Consumer Voice in Standardisation 
(ANEC), the European Environmental Citizens Organisation for 
Standardisation (ECOS) and the European Trade Union Institute 
(ETUI)). Furthermore, as part of its outreach strategy TC 229 has 
established two Task Groups working on Sustainability (TGS)11, as 
well as on Consumer and Societal Dimensions of Nanotechnologies 
(TGCSDN) (ISO, 2012).  
Regarding the outcomes, as of start 2013, TC 229 has 
published three standards, while the majority of deliverables have 
been normative and informative documents developed in the form of 
technical specifications (TSs) and technical reports (TRs).12 As 
articulated in the TC 229 business plan, the Committee has given 
priority to developing horizontal standards that “provide 
foundational   support  across  all   sectors   that  use  nanotechnologies  or  
nanomaterials”   (ISO,   2012).13   These   deliverables   have   no   strict   legal  
value  nor  provide  for  excessive  constraints.  However,  they  constitute  
important  statements,  provide  concrete  and  practical  information  and  
address  a  broader  range  of  products  and  activities.   
 
4.2. OECD Working Party on Manufactured Nanomaterials 
(OECD/WPMN)  
 
OECD/WPMN was established in 2006 to promote “international co-
operation in human health and environmental safety related aspects 
of manufactured nanomaterials (MNs), in order to assist in the 
development of rigorous safety evaluation of nanomaterials” (OECD, 
2012). The WPMN work programme was adopted by the Chemicals 
Committee in November 2006 and focuses on three key working 
areas:  
 
a) Work Area 1 - which aims to develop working definitions for MNs 
                                                
11  TGS have the mandate to advise the TC229 on how to include sustainability within its 
strategic priorities.  
12 Such documents are usually approved while the subject matter is still under development or 
when there is no immediate agreement to publish an International Standard .  
13 See also Hatto, P . and MacLachlan, S. (2010). Standardising nanotechnologies, Available from: 
http://www.iom3.org/news/standardising-nanotechnologies; 	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for regulatory purposes within the context of environmental, 
health and safety (EHS) issues;  
b) Work Area 2 - which aims to encourage cooperation and 
coordination on risk assessment frameworks; and  
c) Work Area 3 - which aims to foster co-operation and share 
information on current and planned initiatives in risk 
assessment, risk management and regulatory frameworks 
(Visser, 2007).  
 
To fulfill these overarching aims, WPMN has developed eight 
projects. These projects focus on:  
 
a) the development of an OECD Database on EHS research for 
approval (Project 1);  
b) the EHS research strategies on MNs (Project 2);  
c) the safety testing of a representative set of MNs and test 
guidelines (Project 3);  
d) MNs and test guidelines (Project 4);  
e) co-operation on voluntary schemes and regulatory programmes 
(Project 5);  
f) co-operation on risk assessments (Project 6);  
g) the role of alternative methods in nanotoxicology (Project 7);  
h) exposure measurement with an initial focus on occupational 
settings (Project 8) ; and  
i)  cooperation on the environmentally sustainable use of MNs 
(Project 9).  
 
Each project is carried out by specific steering groups (SGs) (OECD, 
2011). These groups are composed of experts nominated by the 
delegation heads participating in the work of the OECD/WPMN.  
WPMN is a subsidiary body established under the Chemicals 
Committee. This Committee functions under the OECD 
Environment, Health, and Safety Division and consists of 
governmental officials from the OECD countries responsible for 
chemicals management. As such, WPMN encourages the 
participation of observers and invited experts that participate in the 
work of the Chemicals Committee. There are 34 OECD member 
countries that participate in the work of the WPMN. Member 
countries drive the agenda and the output of the WPMN, while 
financing a major part of its work and voting on proposals and policy 
recommendations. These countries are represented at the WPMN 
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meetings by the delegation heads14, each of whom is drawn from their 
national agencies responsible for chemicals regulation and the safety 
of human health and the environment. Nominated delegates are 
selected by consensus on the basis of merit, and their roles and duties 
are set up by the Committee and the WPMN. 
Since its establishment in 2006, there have been ten meetings 
of the OECD/WPMN, which have been supplemented with several 
workshops, expert meetings and conferences (Kica and Bowman, 
2012). In addition to these actors, the OECD has taken several steps to 
establish close relationships with nonmember countries like Russia, 
China, Thailand, South Africa, India, the E.U. Commission (EC), U.N. 
bodies, ISO, WHO and other stakeholder groups such as those 
represented through the Trade Union Advisory Committee (TUAC) 
and the Business and Industry Advisory Committee (BIAC). The 
wide range of actors emphasizes clearly the drive within the OECD 
to opt for a multistakeholder representation and secure support for 
its policy recommendations through a broader range of experts. This 
also allows us to assess the WPMN as a transnational arrangement. 
With regards to the outcomes, it is important to note that 
WPMN does not have regulatory power, but it serves as a center for 
international collaboration and policy dialogue, building 
“communities of practice that promote information sharing and 
harmonization” (Abbott et al., 2012: 291; Falkner and Jaspers, 2012). 
The key achievements to date are the Sponsorship Programme15, the 
OECD Database on Manufactured Nanomaterials to Inform and Analyse 
EHS Research Activities, and the Preliminary Guidance on Sample 
Preparation and Dosimetry for the Safety of Nanomaterials (OECD, 2011; 
OECD, 2011a; OECD, 2012).  
  
                                                
14 These delegates serve as the main contacting point to the Working Party, and provide information on 
the experts that are nominated by member countries to participate in the work of the SGs (see Kica and 
Bowman, 2012).  
15  The  Sponsorship  Programme,  as  one  of  the  key  outcomes  of  the  WPMN,  gathered  a  number  of  
countries  and  the  BIAC,  who  volunteered  to  sponsor  and  cosponsor  the  testing  of  one  or  more  
MNs  and  provide  test  data,  reference  or  testing  materials  to  the  lead  sponsors.  In  2011-­‐‑2012  the  
results  of  the  Sponsorship  testing  programme  were  analyzed  by  the  OECD  to  determine  whether  
its  member  countries  needed  to  modify  the  existing  test  methods  or  guidelines  used  for  testing  
traditional   chemicals   (OECD,   2012).   In   September   2013,   the   Council   of   the   OECD   issued   a  
recommendation   on   the  Safety   Testing   and  Assessment   of  MNs.   The   recommendation   indicates  
that   member   countries   apply   the   “existing   international   and   national   chemical   regulatory  
frameworks  to  manage  the  risks  associated  with  manufactured  nanomaterials”  and  that  only  in  
few  cases  these  “systems  may  need  to  be  adapted  to  take  into  account  the  specific  properties  of  
manufactured  nanomaterials”  (OECD,  2013).  
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4.3. International Risk Governance Council (IRGC) 
 
IRGC is an independent foundation that was initially founded by the 
Swiss government, to help the understanding and management of 
emerging global risks (Renn and Rocco, 2006). Since the beginning of 
2005 the Council has also been working actively on nanotechnology 
issues. The key objectives of IRGC in relation to nanotechnology are: 
“to develop and make available specific advice for improving risk 
governance; to provide a neutral and constructive platform on the 
most appropriate approaches to handling the risks and opportunities 
of nanotechnology and to enable all actors to reach a global 
consensus” (Renn and Rocco, 2006: 6).  
  The key bodies within the IRGC are the Board Members, 
Advisory Committee and the Scientific & Technical Council (S&TC). 
Members of the Board are drawn from governments, industry, 
science and non-governmental organisations.16 The Advisory 
Committee is the key body, which comprises of individual members 
(17 members) appointed by the Board to act as advisors and make 
proposals to the S&TC on the possible issues that need to be 
addressed by the IRGC. These members come from USA, Germany, 
France, Belgium, Korea, Switzerland, China and Canada. The S&TC 
is the leading scientific authority of the foundation. It comprises 
experts form a range of scientific and organisational background, 
who review the scientific quality of the IRGC work and its 
deliverables. The participation of these actors at the IRGC is 
voluntary, but there is less available information on how they are 
selected and how the decision making process is structured in this 
arrangement.  
The IRGC’s nanotechnology programme is a key forum for 
dialogue and is supported mainly by the Swiss Reinsurance 
Company, EPA and the US Department of State (IRGC, 2007). To 
tackle issues of nanotechnology the IRGC, and the S&TC in 
particular, proposed the establishment of the working group on 
nanotechnology to provide an independent and cross-disciplinary 
approach to nanotechnology risks and hazards. The group has 
focused on two projects: on the risk governance of nanotechnology (in 
2005) and on nanotechnology applications in food and cosmetics (2007). 
These projects were led by expert bodies consisting of recognized 
subject experts in the field of nanotechnology and risk governance, 
who prepared and reviewed the project reports (IRGC, 2007). For 
instance, the first project was led by Dr. Mihail Roco of the National 
Science Foundation (NSF) and a team of scientific experts coming 
from universities, research centers, governmental bodies, 
                                                
16  The  members  of  the  board  come  from  USA,  Portugal,  Switzerland  and  China.    
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laboratories.  
  Over a period of two-years, the IRGC undertook two expert 
workshops (May 2005 and January 2006) (IRGC, 2006; IRGC, 2007). 
During the second workshop, the IRGC working group also 
organized four surveys on the implications of nanotechnology with 
stakeholders coming from research organisations, standardisation 
organisations, nanotechnology start-ups, NGOs. The aim of the 
surveys was to identify the organisation interest in nanotechnology 
research, the governance gaps as well as measures needed to address 
potential risks. These activities resulted in the publication of the 
“White Paper on Nanotechnology Risk Governance” in 2006 and the 
“Policy Brief: Recommendations for a global, coordinated approach to the 
governance of potential risks” in 2007 (Breggin et al., 2009; IRGC, 2007). 
 The White Paper and the Policy Brief suggest a regulatory 
framework, which anticipates two frames for four generations of 
nanotechnology. Frame one includes the first generation of 
nanostructures (the steady function nanostructures), which have 
stable behaviour and do not constitute excessive risks. Frame two 
involves the second generation (active function nanostructures), the 
third generation (systems of nanosystems) and the fourth generation 
of nanostructures (heterogeneous molecular nanosystems). In the 
second frame are involved nanostructures which change their design 
and it is more difficult to predict their behaviour (IRGC, 2007). It is 
important to note that these deliberations have been amongst the first 
publications to provide detailed recommendations for the risk 
governance of nanotechnology (IRGC, 2007). They recommend 
national and international decision makers who are involved in the 
nanotechnology risk issues “to improve knowledge base, strengthen 
risk management structures and processes, promote stakeholder 
communication and collaboration, and ensure social benefits and 
acceptance” (IRGC, 2007: 15). As such, the White Paper and the Policy 
Brief have become widely cited reference points in various reports 
and documents (Breggin et al., 2009; Mantovani et al., 2012; Pelley 
and Saner).  
 
4.4. International Council on Nanotechnology (ICON):  
 
ICON  was   created   in   late   2004  within   the   program   of   the   federally  
funded   Center   for   Biological   and   Environmental   Nanotechnology  
(CBEN)  at  Rice  University.  Shortly  after  its  creation,  ICON  extended  
its  activities  beyond  CBEN  to  include  other  national  and  international  
centers.  ICON  has  been  actively  involved  on  tackling  issues  related  to  
nanotechnologies   (Pelley   and   Saner,   2009).   Its  mission   is   to   “assess,  
reduce   and   communicate   information   regarding   the   potential  
environmental  and  health  risks of nanotechnology, while maximizing 
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its societal values” (ICON, 2009: 3).  
The key bodies of ICON are the Director and the Executive 
Director, who are responsible for managing the internal coordination 
of the Council and ensuring an effective external presence. The 
Council is largely funded by industry17 and it has established an 
Advisory Board which is composed of prominent nanomaterial safety 
experts coming from industry, government agencies, academic 
institutions and nongovernmental groups. Participation in ICON is 
voluntary and non-compensated, and there are around 27 members 
participating in the Advisory Board coming from France, Japan, the 
Netherlands, Switzerland, Taiwan, the United Kingdom and the 
United States. The Executive Committee, consisting of the Director 
and Executive Director, has the ultimate authority over ICON’s 
finances, the membership of the Advisory Board and of the setting of 
new committees (ICON, 2009).  
ICON has been working on several projects related to 
nanotechnology such as the International Assessment of Research Needs 
for Nanotechnology Environment, Health and Safety; Current Practices for 
Occupational Handling of Nanomaterials and the Good NanoGuide. The 
main objectives of the first two projects have been to: a) facilitate the 
documentation of current best practices for identifying and managing 
risks that come during the production, handling, use and disposal of 
nanomaterials, and b) prioritize research needs related to the 
classification nanomaterials (ICON, 2009). As such they have resulted 
in several workshops and conferences. ICON’s third project - the 
GoodNanoGuide – is an internet based collaboration platform designed 
to help experts in the field of nanotechnology to exchange ideas on 
how best to handle nanomaterials safely (Kulinowski and Matthew, 
2009). The key objective of the GoodNanoGuide is to establish an open 
forum that complements other nanotechnology information projects 
by providing up-to-date information on good practices for handling 
of nanomaterials in an occupational setting. The GoodNanoGuide is 
freely accessible for everyone, but only experts who are members of 
the GoodNanoGuide are able to post information (Kulinowski and 
Matthew, 2009). The forum has attracted a wide range of 
stakeholders to collaborate and contribute at both intellectual and 
financial   levels.   However,   according   to   its   Director,   the   main  
weakness  of  the  GoodNanoGuide  is  its  reliance  on  industry  funds  only,  
which  “reduces  the  credibility  [of  this  platform  to]  stakeholders  and  
challenges   [its]   sustainability   in   a   down   economy”   (Abbott   et   al.,  
                                                
17  The  key  sponsors  of  ICON’s  work  are:  DuPont;  Intel;  Lockheed  Martin;  L’Oreal;  Mitsubishi  
Corporation;  Procter  &  Gamble;  Swiss  Reinsurance  Company.    
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2012:   296).   The   platform   was   set   in   2008   and   in   the   website   it   is  
indicated  that  the  GoodNanoGuide  is  still  in  a  beta  version.18 
 
4.5. Intergovernmental Forum on Chemical Safety (IFCS)  
 
IFCS was established in 1994 in the International Conference of 
Chemicals Safety. The main objective in establishing IFCS was to 
create an “over-arching framework through which national 
governments, intergovernmental organisations and NGOs could 
work together and build consensus to promote chemical safety and 
address the environmentally sound management of chemicals” 
(IFCS, 1997: 2).  
The idea to establish IFCS was created in 1991, during the 
preparations for the United Nations Conference on Environment and 
Development (UNED). The Forum is under the administration of 
WHO, which also provides the secretariat for IFCS. Participation in 
the IFCS is open to governmental participants (which include all 
member state of the UN and its specialized agencies); 
intergovernmental participants (including participants representing 
subregional, regional, political and economic groups of countries 
involved in chemical safety); and non-governmental participants 
(including NGOs concerned with science, health and workers 
interest). Participation is voluntary and supported by the members. 
The work of IFCS is organized in sessions at intervals of 2-3 years. To 
achieve its objectives, IFCS has established the Forum Standing 
Committee (FCS) to provide advice and assistance during the 
preparations of Forum meetings, monitor progress on the work of the 
IFCS and assist with regional efforts. FCS is composed of 25 
participants, who serve as representatives of the views of participant 
countries in respective IFCS regions, NGOs or intergovernmental 
organisations.  
Since its creation IFCS has held six meetings/sessions. In its 
sixth session in 2008, IFCS considered for the first time the 
opportunities and challenges of nanotechnology and MNs. The final 
outcome of this meeting was the Dakar Statement on Manufactured 
Nanomaterials calling for more international cooperation in 
information sharing and risk assessment (Breggin et al., 2009). The 
meeting had around 200 delegates, representing 70 governments, 12 
intergovernmental organisations and 39 NGOs. Amongst other 
issues, two main items were discussed in this session. The primary 
                                                
18   This  means   that   this  web-­‐‑based   application   is   running,   but   it   is   still   not   fully   ready   and   is  
being  continuously  revised.    
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issue was whether to distinguish between nanotechnologies and 
MNs and to integrate them into the IFCS VI agenda. 
Whereas   most   NGOs   and   developing   countries   argued   for  
including   both   the   MNs   and   nanotechnology,   European   countries  
supported  the  inclusion  of  only  MNs  in  the  IFCS  agenda.  As  a  result,  
delegates   agreed   to   include   a   preambular   paragraph   in   the   Dakar  
statement   acknowledging   the   need   to   address   the   safety   aspect   of  
nanotechnologies  “while  limiting  the  focus  of  the  statement  on  safety  
aspects   of   nanomaterials   only”   (IFCS,   2008:   5).   Amongst   other  
recommendations   the  Dakar   Statement   called   the   governments   and  
the   industry   to   apply   the   “precautionary   principle   throughput   the  
lifecycle   of   manufactured   nanomaterials”   (IFCS,   2008:   12).   The  
Statement   recommended   the   evaluation   of   “the   feasibility   of  
developing   global   codes   of   conduct   in   a   timely   manner”   and   the  
provision   of   information   “through   product   labeling,   websites,  
databases   […]   and   cooperative   actions   between   governments   and  
stakeholders”   (IFCS,   2008:   6).   These   recommendations   provided   an  
important   contribution   for   advancing   the   sound   management   of  
chemicals  globally  and  were  sent   to   the  International  Conference  on  
Chemicals  Management  (ICCM)  for  consideration  and  further  actions  
(ENB,   2012;   IFCS,   2008).  Another   key   agenda   item  during   the   sixth  
meeting   of   the   IFCS   was   the   future   of   this   Forum.   In   light   of   the  
agreement   on   the   Strategic   Approach   to   International   Chemical  
Management  (SAICM)  in  2006,  the  delegates  of  IFCS  agreed  to  invite  
the  ICCM  (during  its  second  session  -­‐‑  ICCM2)  to  integrate  the  Forum  
as  an  advisory  body  into  the  ICCM  (ENB,  2012).  This  invitation  was  
crucial  for  IFCS,  since  the  decision  of  the  ICCM2  to  reject  the  request  
of   the   IFCS  put   into  question   the   existence  and   the  potential   of   this  
Forum  to  contribute   to   the   field  of  nanotechnologies.  This   is   further  
elaborated  in  the  next  Section.    
 
 
 
 
Section  5.Concluding  Remarks    
 
This chapter aimed to assess the potential of different TGAs in the 
field of nanotechnologies and to explain the key factors that drive the 
emergence of these arrangements. It highlights the growing 
importance and relevance of five TGAs, such as: ISO/TC 229, 
OECD/WPMN, IRGC, ICON and IFCS. Building upon current 
debates on the modes of governance and transnationalisation, the 
chapter developed a framework to determine the main attributes of 
TGAs. This framework proved to be very useful for understanding 
the potential of different types of governance arrangements to 
contribute to the field of nanotechnologies. A comparative look at 
these arrangements suggests the following:  
First, in the field of nanotechnologies TGAs have all taken 
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various initiatives to assemble the needed competencies while 
combining the expertise and experiences of multiple actors. Yet, the 
relative input that states, NGOs and firms have in these 
arrangements differs considerably. We elaborate this further in 
below. Furthermore, the arrangements differ considerably in terms of 
their institutional structure, organisational goals and substantive 
scope, all of which impact their potential to contribute effectively to 
the governance of nanotechnologies. 
 Second, all of the arrangements reviewed in this chapter have 
engaged in agenda setting and related preliminary steps. For 
instance, ICON and IRGC have focused mainly to internationalize the 
nanotechnology safety and regulatory debate. They have served as 
leading fora for gathering information on the risks of nanoscale 
materials to inform future regulation, and supporting coordination 
amongst decision makers on handling these issues (Breggin et al., 
2009). IFCS was a pioneer in identifying nanotechnology as an 
important part of the international chemical safety agenda. It aimed 
at sharing information and promoting coordination on 
nanotechnology and MNs to increase awareness on the potential 
benefits, challenges and risks posed by nanotechnologies. In addition 
to health and safety issues, the leaders of the TC 229 have addressed 
other issues that are essential to nanotechnology regulation, such as 
nomenclature, specifications and measurement. The OECD/WPMN 
has also served as the main forum for gathering and exchanging 
information on the risk assessment of MNs. Therefore, these 
arrangements differ in their functions, but also on the normative 
scope of the issues that they address.  
  This leads us to our third point. A comparative look at these 
arrangements suggests that some arrangements seem to be narrower, 
focusing almost entirely on certain products (i.e. IFCS on safety 
aspect of MNs), settings (ICON - and GoodNanoGuide in particular - 
on workplace) or activities (IRGC on risk governance) (Abbott et al., 
2012). OECD/WPMN concentrates on human health and 
environmental safety implications (including risk assessment and 
safety testing) of MNs (OECD, 2011a). TC 229 addresses a broader 
range of products, setting and activities. With its standards, TC 229 
provides terminology and nomenclature, measurement techniques, 
calibration procedures, reference materials, test methods to detect 
and identify nanoparticles, occupational health protocols relevant to 
nanotechnologies as well as risk assessment tools - which aim to 
support regulation, research, commercialization, and trade of the 
materials and products at the nanoscale.  
A number of these arrangements (such as TC 229, 
OECD/WPMN) have also adopted norms that call relevant actors to 
act in accordance to certain standards. In this way, these 
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arrangements have started to move towards the negotiation stage. TC 
229 for instance has been able to negotiate several standards, as well 
as technical specifications and recommendations (e.g. ISO/TS 27687; 
ISO/TR 12885). From a governance point of view, these deliberations 
may provide the “best available options to industries requested to 
demonstrate product compliance with regulation” (EC, 2008: 17). The 
Sponsorship Programme has also served as an incentive for countries to 
collaborate, share best practices, and follow a consistent approach 
with regards to the testing of specific endpoints of representative 
MNs. The substantive scope of these deliberations differs, with the 
TC 229 standards and technical specifications providing practical 
information, and being more concrete and complete (Abbot et al., 
2012).  
Fourth, a comparative look on these arrangements 
emphasizes that ISO and OECD seem to have the highest potential to 
contribute to the governance of nanotechnologies. In our view, there 
are two key factors that contribute to this. On the one hand, it is the 
high level of institutional structure that characterizes these 
governance arrangements. On the other hand, it is the collaboration 
and the (political) support that these arrangements have ensured 
with key actors in Europe (EP, 2006; EC, 2008). Regarding the first 
point, our case studies emphasize that nanotechnology transantional 
governance arrangements differ considerably in terms of their 
structure, membership and organisational goals. TC 229 and WPMN 
are the most organized working groups with secretariats, clear rules 
of membership, governance structure and decision making 
procedures (Forsberg, 2010; Kica and Bowman, 2013). Furthermore, 
they have organized regular meetings for their members to share 
knowledge and information and developed concrete roadmaps that 
guide future actions and strategies. Such a well-defined structure has 
helped these arrangements to contribute substantially to shaping 
nanotechnology regulatory agenda at transantional level, promote 
collaboration and harmonization, and establish concrete regulatory 
governance mechanisms (e.g. standards, guidelines or other 
regulatory options) for nanotechnologies (Abbott et al., 2012; EC, 
2008; Forsberg, 2010; Kica and Bowman, 2013).  
ISO is amongst the most recognized international 
organisations, which has strongest linkages with key experts and 
dominant industrial actors coming from more than 40 countries 
around the world. However, to ensure representation of other 
stakeholders TC 229 has established liaisons with other actors 
representing government, trade unions, consumer associations, 
NGOs and the EU. In addition to this, the establishment of the Task 
Groups (i.e. TGS and TGCSDN) appears to have been one approach 
to opening up the membership of TC 229, and thus making its actions 
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accountable to a broader range of actors. Since 2005, TC 229 has been 
able to broaden its activities, membership and the diversity of actors 
involved in the process (Forsberg 2010 and 2012; Kica and Bowman, 
2012). TC 229 plenary meetings involve a wide range of practitioners, 
industrial hygienists, pharmacologists, toxicologists and 
ecotoxicologists, chemists and physicists who exchange knowledge 
and contribute substantially to establishing international standards 
(Kica and Bowman, 2012). 
In a similar vein, OECD/WPMN and its SGs are highly 
structured. WPMN has strong linkages with national regulatory 
agencies, which is not surprising given the intergovernmental nature 
of the OECD. However, the inclusion of high level experts nominated 
by member countries has helped SGs to proceed faster in developing 
well-defined strategies for tracking nanotechnology policy 
developments. OECD has also developed liaisons with other 
industrial actors, trade unions, NGOs as well as European 
Commission. While serving as a center for policy dialogue between 
high level governmental officials and nongovernmental experts, there 
is the potential for the outputs of the OECD/WPMN to lay the 
groundwork for collective agreements and contribute to overcoming 
the uncertainties and regulatory puzzles related to nanomaterials and 
risk assessment practices (Bowman and Gillian, 2007; Kica and 
Bowman, 2013). This is not without precedent; for example it is 
widely acknowledged that the OECD Chemicals Committee played a 
leading role in promoting harmonized chemical control policies 
through the system of the Mutual Acceptance Data (MAD) (Kica and 
Bowman, 2013; Visser, 2007). 
Regarding the support that these arrangements have ensured 
with key actors in Europe, perhaps of greatest importance is the 
support of the EU members and the EU Commission. In 2007, the 
European Commission Communication on the Nanosciences and 
Nanotechnologies: An action plan for Europe 2005-2009, stated that 
OECD/WPMN and TC229 are “principal forums for the coordination 
of activities at the international level” and that “the Commission, the 
European Bodies and Member States are expected to continue 
contributing to these international efforts” (EC, 2007: 10). The 
Council’s conclusions on Nanoscience and Nanotechnologies also stated 
that, “ the Commission needs to take into account in its policy 
making all activities within the OECD (e.g. definitions, nomenclature, 
risk management)” (EP, 2006: 428). Regarding, the role of 
international standards in the field of nanotechnologies, in 2010 the 
EU Commission addressed a mandate to the European 
Standardisation Bodies (ESOs) (i.e. CEN, CENELEC and ETSI) to 
develop European standards related to the characterization and 
toxicity testing of the nanomaterials, as well as to the occupational 
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handling and exposure (EC, 2008b).19 An important element of the 
Mandate is that the EC requests the ESOs to develop and adopt 
European standards in support of the European policies and 
legislations, while taking into account and giving priority to the 
existing ISO standards (EC, 2008). Furthermore, the Mandate asks the 
ESOs to work in close collaboration with ISO and OECD. These 
statements indicate clearly that the EU not only is aware of the work 
undertaken by ISO and OECD, but it also suggests that these 
arrangements and their deliverables are relevant and can contribute 
to the nanotechnology regulatory debate in the EU.20  
Other governance arrangements analyzed in this chapter, 
have also been able to ensure collaboration with influential 
stakeholders. IFCS for instance managed to provide equal 
representation to state actors, NGOs and intergovernmental actors. 
Regarding its structure, IFCS has the most informal structure. IFCS 
operates under the intergovernmental regime of the WHO, but it 
considers itself as a “non-institutional arrangement”, a forum that 
builds on the loose grouping of interested parties and experts, who 
come together to integrate national and international efforts to 
promote chemical safety (Mercier, 1996: 886). However, even though 
being one of the key actors to consider issues related to  
nanotechnologies within the international chemicals agenda, the 
rejection of the ICMM2 to include IFCS as an advisory body put into 
question the ability of this forum to contribute effectively to 
nanotechnology governance (ENB, 2012). Furthermore, in the final 
resolution on the emerging issues the ICMM2 recognized the 
potential health and environmental issues related to 
nanotechnologies and MNs, but no reference was made to the Dakar 
Statement. In light of these events, in the last session of the Forum 
(Forum IV) the FCS agreed to suspend its work for the foreseeable 
future (ENB, 2012).  
ICON and IRGC have a moderate level of institutionalization 
with both having established several workshops and a network of 
growing stakeholders. Both of these arrangements focus on 
nanotechnology risk governance, but none of these arrangements 
aspires to go beyond mere information exchange and international 
coordination. The IRGC in the initial phases of its work on 
nanotechnologies developed an ad-hoc working group on 
                                                
19 In the mandate the EC stated that nanotechnology standardisation is crucial and is viewed as 
“a means to accompany the introduction on the market of nanotechnologies and nanomaterials, 
and a means to facilitate the implementation of regulation”. 
20  That this will also have a positive impact on the effectiveness of the norms is concluded in 
Wessel, R.A.  and Wouters, J. (2008), The Phenomenon of Multilevel Regulation: Interactions between 
Global, EU and National Regulatory Spheres, eds Føllesdal, A. Wessel, R.A.  and Wouters, J. 
“Multilevel Regulation and the EU: The Interplay between Global, European and National 
Normative Processes”, Leiden, Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, pp. 9-47. 
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nanotechnology to provide an independent and cross-disciplinary 
approach to nanotechnology risks and hazards. However, this group 
does not have the same structure with clear rules for membership, 
formalized decision making structures as well as strategies for future 
work like TC 229 for instance. Its Advisory Committee is 
representative of a less number of European countries, but it has the 
support of EPA. In 2006, IRGC organized a Conference to promote 
stakeholder dialogue and feedback on the IRGC White Paper (ISO, 
2007; IRGC, 2008).What we can observe here is the participation of 
actors from regulatory agencies (e.g. DEFRA) as well as industrial 
actors (e.g. DuPont). The inclusion of these actors combined with the 
support that EPA has for IRGC can contribute to increasing the 
relevance of the Council’s recommendations in the field of 
nanotechnologies. ICON, on the other hand has also a moderate level 
of institutionalization. Compared to ISO and OECD, its working 
groups are less structured with few members and less formalized 
decision making strategies. The Council started initially as an affiliate 
programme of the CBEN center at Risse University, but it has been 
able to build a network of growing stakeholders. Council has also 
been working with EPA to review the best practices for nanomaterial 
safety (IRGC, 2006). GoodNanoGuide is one of the main outcomes of 
ICON which still continues to be in a beta version (IRGC, 2006). 
Whereas the relevance of IRGC and ICON has been mentioned in 
some documents (EC, 2007; EC, 2007a; Mantovani et al., 2010), none 
of them has been involved formally by the EU institutions. 
Furthermore, compared to TC 229 and OECD/WPMN, these 
arrangements have not established any formal collaboration with the 
EU institutions or Commission.  
  In conclusion, our analysis on nanotechnology TGAs suggest 
that IRGC and ICON have the potential to become important actors 
on the transnational governance of nanotechnology risk regulation. 
However, the institutional structure, the actors, the normative scope, 
the political support and the strategies incorporated by TC 229 and 
OECD/WPMN places these arrangements in a better position to take 
a lead on the transnational  debates of nanotechnology governance. 
The huge potential of these arrangements, which operate beyond the 
state level, brings forward many concerns. In these arrangements the 
rule making authority rests on the hands of those who operate 
beyond the state level and are “neither elected nor managed by 
elected officials” (Thatcher, 2011). They build on non-hierarchical 
steering principles and are characterized by interaction amongst 
various public and private actors. As such, they have become the 
“hard case” for legitimacy (Black, 2008), raising therefore many 
questions over the clear lines of accountability, stakeholder 
representation, roots of decision-making and reasons for social 
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acceptability. Such questions are beyond the scope of this chapter, 
but pose an urgent need for further research.21 
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